Senator Carr: The Minister for Defence has provided the following answer to the honourable senator's question: The response to Senate Questions on Notice 776,777 and 778 details all reviews that were being undertaken by Defence as at 31 October 2011. That response also covered reviews that were completed in the period 1 January to 30 June 2011. The following reviews are currently being conducted or were recently concluded (since 31 October 2011) by the Department of Defence as at 31 January 2012. Review No. 1 (a) Name of the review Air Force Review into Civil Aviation Access to Air Force Air Fields (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Review being conducted internally by members of the Royal Australian Air Force. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Nil (d) Terms of reference To address the impacts and consequences of the use of Air Force airfields by civil aircraft, with recommendations to enable the drafting and implementation of policy that supports the current and future needs of military aviation. (e) Timeline Review was conducted in 2010, with the policy creation to be completed by 2012. (f) Cost per stage Nil (g) Anticipated final cost Nil (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Review was completed and published on 16 June 2011. A period of public consultation was completed on 31 October 2011. The drafting of Defence policy on civil aviation access to Air Force airfields to be completed by fourth quarter 2012. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department N/A (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Deputy Chief of Air Force Review No. 2 (a) Name of the review Defence Budget Review. (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Chief Finance Officer, Acting First Assistant Secretary Financial Management & Reporting and Deloitte Australia. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Deloitte Australia. (d) Terms of reference Undertake a line by line assessment of the budget aggregates to clarify: accountabilities for allocated budgets; the methodology for constructing each of the individual budget estimates; the frequency and methodology for updating the budget estimate during the year; and the Group Head/Service Chief responsible for the construction and authorisation of individual budget estimates. Undertake a comparative analysis of other large corporates to: determine their approach to developing budget estimates and managing budget estimation risks; and consider the accountability mechanisms used by comparative organisations to manage budget performance. Such corporates will include those that are capital intensive or logistics intensive and will include, but not be limited to, BHP Billiton Limited and Rio Tinto Limited. Review the utility of global contingency, slippage and over-programming in the management of the various capital budgets within Defence unless they are covered by another review such as the DCP Review. Consider the extent to which program budgeting accountability (vis a vis project budgeting accountability) is a driver for estimation quality. Consider the extent to which there are any barriers to the development of quality estimates including but not restricted to: the inherent volatility of an estimate; the timing of budget estimate forecasting within Defence; and the extent to which processes, systems, skill levels or lack of standardisation inhibit budget development. Consider how best to record and report on budget estimates on the corporate systems to enable transparency of budget items and actual achievements. Consider the scope for budget system improvements to incorporate activity level data and opportunities to link activity data to financial budget information. Determine the extent to which budget estimates are flexible or fixed and consider opportunities to manage the inherent uncertainties of Defence's business environment into budget estimation practices. Propose opportunities for improvements to budget estimation methodologies, processes, systems and accountabilities. (e) Timeline The Review is expected to be completed early 2012. (f) Cost per stage $259,840 (g) Anticipated final cost $259,840 (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report A draft report was provided to the Minister for Defence, the Secretary and the Chief of Defence Force mid December 2011 for their review. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department The Budget Review was conducted by Senior Executive Service members of the Department, with assistance from Deloitte Australia. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Minister for Defence. Review No. 3 (a) Name of the review Australian Defence Force Posture Review (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review The Review is being undertaking by the Department of Defence (ADF Posture Review Secretariat) and overseen by an expert panel (Dr Allan Hawke and Mr Ric Smith) (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Expert Panel – Dr Allan Hawke and Mr Ric Smith Deloitte Access Economics was commissioned to conduct a Long Term Economic and Demographic Projections as a supplementary study to the Review. (d) Terms of reference The Force Posture Review will: as its starting point draw on the security, strategic and capability judgements outlined in the Defence White Paper 2009 Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030; draw on work currently underway in Defence through the 2011 Annual Defence Planning Guidance; outline the future security and strategic environment and challenges Australia needs to be positioned to respond to up to 2030; consider the potential strategic and security role of Australia's offshore territories, particularly Cocos and Christmas Islands, for Force Posture requirements; consider the implications for ADF Force Posture of the need for energy security, including security issues associated with expanding offshore resource exploitation in our North West and Northern approaches; consider how the future ADF Force Posture will support Australia's ability to respond to a range of activities including: deployments on missions and operations overseas; support of operations in our wider region; and practical engagement with the countries of the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean rim in ways that help to shape security and strategic circumstances in Australia's interest; assess the impact on the ADF's Force Posture of a range of domestic, demographic and economic issues including: more intense minerals and petroleum resource activities around Defence training and exercise ranges; urban encroachment on existing Defence facilities; community attitudes to living standards and residential locations; and the need for a more cost-effective approach to basing; make recommendations in relation to the basing options for Force 2030 across Australia including in relation to: Navy platforms (including the Air Warfare Destroyers, Landing Helicopter Docks, Future Submarines, the ANZAC Frigate and its replacements and offshore patrol vessels); Army's additional northern basing requirements; and Air Force's plans to introduce a range of new aircraft and associated support systems into service; and consider other relevant issues including population and population spread. (Ref: Media Release MR 177/11, dated 22 June 2011) (e) Timeline The Review commenced in July 2011 and it is expected to complete by 30 March 2012, when the final report is due for submission to Government. (f) Cost per stage The cost as at 31 December 2011 is $158,600. (g) Anticipated final cost The final cost of the Review will not be known until its completion. (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report The Review has provided a progress report to the Minister for Defence in December 2011. Government has directed that the Review's final report will be provided on 30 March 2012. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department As directed by the Minister for Defence in his Media Release on 22 June 2011, the Review is guided by an Expert Panel of eminent experts in defence and national security policy, Dr Allan Hawke and Mr Ric Smith, both are former Secretaries of the Department of Defence. The Review is supported by a Secretariat comprise of a small team of Defence APS and ADF staff; and it also draws on the broad range of expertise within Defence, including both professional military and civilian officers at executive levels (O6/EL2, AS/1-Star, and SES Band 3/3-Star). (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review This Review is directed by the Minister for Defence on 22 June 2011. Review No. 4 (a) Name of the review Review of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Mr Bill Blick, AM, PSM (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Mr Bill Blick, AM, PSM (d) Terms of reference The Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention of Proliferation) Act 1995 (the WMD Act, the Act) and the Regulations provide the framework for the implementation of Australia's international obligations and national policy to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The review of the WMD Act and Regulations will offer recommendations on any changes required. Based on experience in cases that have been assessed, and cases where prohibition orders have been made, the review could usefully consider the following issues: 1. The adequacy and suitability of the test in section 14 of the Act for the Minister to issue a notice prohibiting the export or supply of goods or the provision of services; 2. Whether the issuing of a section 14 notice should be limited to a 12 month period; 3. Whether the Act should include a mechanism to enable persons to seek the Minister's confirmation that a proposed activity is not subject to control under the Act; 4. The consequences of the Minister providing a confirmation as detailed above and whether the consequences need to be limited by the Act or in some other way; 5. Whether there is a need for additional protections for the disclosure of classified information under the Act; 6. Whether the current application of procedural fairness requirements under the Act needs to be modified given the reliance on classified information in decisions made under the Act; 7. Whether consideration should be given to establishing a process to review decisions made under the Act or regulations; 8. Does the Act's definition of a WMD program adequately describe the types of goods and services that Australia seeks to control; 9. The adequacy and suitability of the requirement under sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Act for a prosecution to prove that a person believes or suspects, on reasonable grounds and whether an alternative test should be applied; 10. Whether the investment of funds in companies that develop, produce, acquire or stockpile weapons of mass destruction should be controlled by the Act; 11. Whether provisions, additional to those enabling the Minister to seek an injunction, should be considered for Commonwealth agencies to allow goods to be either held at the border or to compel a person to not proceed with an activity, while an assessment of the goods is undertaken; 12. Whether the 'state of mind' provisions in the Act relating to bodies corporate should deviate from the current Commonwealth policy which is to rely on Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code; 13. Whether the forfeiture, seizure and destruction provisions in the Act and regulations appropriately meet the needs for effective law enforcement; 14. Whether the Act should provide any legal protection (similar to that provided by section 17G of the Charter of the United Nations (Sanctions- Iran) Regulations 2008) to persons who are forced to breach their contractual obligations due to being issued with a prohibition notice or permit with conditions that limit the company's ability to meet their obligations under the contract; 15. Whether the Act should provide a mechanism for compensating a person, where a decision under the Act impacts financially upon a person; 16. Whether the proposed Defence Trade Controls legislation implementing the Australia-US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty has any implication for the Act and decisions taken thereunder; 17. Processes in place to ensure that the Minister for Defence is appropriately and adequately consulted with respect to decisions taken pursuant to the Act; 18. Processes in place to ensure relevant departments and agencies are working together in a coordinated way, in particular the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Defence Export Control Office; 19. The implementation of the recommendations contained in the Brady Review of WMD Act Decision Making Processes, including whether there should be a single Prohibited Export Control Centre; and 20. Any other matters you consider appropriate to report on. (e) Timeline Mr Blick is expected to undertake the review between 01 November 2011 and 01 July 2012 (f) Cost per stage N/A (g) Anticipated final cost This review is expected to cost $65,000 (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Mr Blick is expected to report to Defence in mid-2012 (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department Mr Blick was chosen to conduct this review because of his depth of experience in Commonwealth policy, particularly in relation to considering accountability and the public interest in areas of national security and the application of law. He is a former Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. He has also held other senior Commonwealth appointments, including Deputy Secretary in the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and Deputy Commonwealth Ombudsman. Defence decided to review the Act in order to capture the lessons from its experience of applying it in recent years and to ensure that the legislation and surrounding processes reflect current regulatory best practice. This review will complement a review of decision-making processes under the Act, conducted in 2010 by Mr Martin Brady AO. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review The Hon. Stephen Smith, Minister for Defence Review No. 5 (a) Name of the review Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security – Inquiry into allegations of inappropriate vetting practices in the Defence Security Authority and related matters. (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid N/A. (d) Terms of reference Investigation into allegations of inappropriate vetting practices in the Defence Security Authority and related matters. (e) Timeline The Minister for Defence tabled the final report on 8 February 2012. (f) Cost per stage N/A. (g) Anticipated final cost $40,000 Note –This review was requested by the Prime Minister and IGIS is responsible for this activity. However, Defence is expected to provide funds to meet the cost of conducting the review. (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report The Minister for Defence tabled the final report on 8 February 2012. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department Preliminary investigation undertaken by Defence Inspector-General. More comprehensive review able to be undertaken by Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security due to the powers given under the relevant Commonwealth legislation. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Minister of Defence sought commission of review by Prime Minister. Review No. 6 (a) Name of the review Assessment of Cyber Threat Risks to Internet Facing Applications and Networks. (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Defence Security and Counter Intelligence Board (acting in the role of Project Board representing all Defence Groups and Services and the interest of major ICT System Owners). Defence Security Authority Directorate of Information Systems Security (Project Lead). Chief Information Officers Group (ICT System Maintainers/Owners). Defence Signals Directorate (Provision of expert technical advice). STRATSEC (Conduct of Technical Vulnerability Assessments of selected ICT systems). (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid STRATSEC. (d) Terms of reference Terms Of Reference are Classified RESTRICTED. (e) Timeline Terms of Reference Established 18 October 2010. Review Completed 3 November 2011. (f) Cost per stage One Stage with final cost of $206,722.25. (g) Anticipated final cost $206,722.25. (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report End April 2011. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department Outsourced component of the review included technical vulnerability analysis of ICT systems requiring specialist technical skills. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Chief of the Defence Force tasked Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security with the conduct of the review. Review No. 7 (a) Name of the review DLA Piper Review of Allegations of Sexual and Other Abuse in Defence (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review The contract for the conduct of this Review is between Defence and DLA Piper. Dr Gary Rumble, Professor Dennis Pearce and Ms Melanie McKean (now with HWL Ebsworth) are the Review leads and are subcontracted to DLA Piper for the purposes of the Review. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid DLA Piper. (d) Terms of reference The following terms of reference are available from the DLA Piper website http://www.dlapiper.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Terms_of_Reference.pdf Terms of Reference On 11 April 2011, the Minister for Defence announced that an external law firm would be engaged by the Secretary of Defence to review the allegations of sexual or other forms of abuse that have been drawn to the attention of the Minister's office, as well as to the Department of Defence and the media since the recent Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) incident. The Review will consider all relevant allegations, whether referred from the Minister's Office, raised in the media or coming directly to the Review which have been or are made in the period 01 April -17 June 2011. The Review will be conducted in two phases. Phase 1 will review all allegations of sexual or other abuse and any related matters to make an initial assessment of whether the matters alleged have been appropriately managed and to recommend further action to the Minister. Phase 1 will also report on whether Phase 1 has identified any particular systemic issues that will require further investigation in Phase 2. DLA Piper has been engaged by the Secretary of Defence to conduct Phase 1 of the Review. Phase 2 is expected to provide oversight of Defence's implementation of recommendations of Phase 1. Phase 2 will also review Defence's processes for assessing, investigating and responding to allegations of sexual or other forms of abuse to consider with any systemic issues identified in Phase 1 and any other systemic issues and to make appropriate recommendations about all systemic issues that have been identified. Allegations made within Defence between 01 April 2011 and 17 June 2011 regarding sexual or other forms of abuse, will continue to be dealt with in accordance with standing Defence procedures in parallel with the review. The Review will attempt to address late submissions in its Report although depending on when they are received, it may not be able to address all late submissions. The Report will, however, include recommendations about what steps should be taken in relation to those late allegations/complaints. Allegations received after Friday, 17 June 2011 will be dealt with in accordance with current Defence procedures or such new procedures as may be introduced following the review. Phase 1 Terms of Reference 1. The review is only concerned with alleged abuse perpetrated by Defence personnel1 in connection with their workplace or in the conduct of their duties. 2. The review team will assess all allegations raised, or otherwise under consideration, in the period Friday, 01 April 2011 to Friday, 17 June 2011 of sexual or other forms of abuse (such as bullying, harassment or intimidation) or related matters. 3. The review is not concerned with matters raised directly with the Inspector-General Australian Defence Force (IGADF) which fall within the IGADF's statutory functions. 4. The review team will make an initial assessment of each allegation. 5. For each allegation, the review team will: a. advise the Ministers and Defence as to whether the alleged incident appears to have received proper consideration and appropriate action has been taken, or is being taken, by Defence; and b. make recommendations to the Minister and Defence on further action to be taken. 6. Any matter referred to the Review that is considered by the Review Team to be out of scope of this review will be identified to the Minister with the basis of the Review Team's assessment that it is out of scope so that the Minister may consider what if any further action should be taken. 7. Where the Review considers that further investigation is necessary, the team will make recommendations as to the appropriate mechanisms for such further investigation. 8. Where requested, the review team will offer anonymity and/or confidentiality subject to the provisos that the Review may have to reveal the identity of an informant or other information: a. if required by law to do so; and/or b. to prevent threat of injury or abuse of others. 9. The Attorney-General's Department and the Ombudsman's Office will assist Defence with governance and will undertake 'quality assurance' of the process. 10. In the event that DLA Phillips Fox or Professor Pearce has had any previous involvement in any matters referred for review, those matters will be referred to the Ombudsman's Office. 11. The Review team is to refer any matters requiring urgent referral to police to the ADF Investigative Service (ADFIS). ADFIS is to keep the Review team informed of steps taken in relation to those matters. 12. The Review team will provide fortnightly interim reports to Defence and the Minister on its assessment of allegations and other relevant issues for the duration of Phase 1. 13. The Review team may need to access and review records held by Defence as part of Phase 1. 14. This review will continue until all matters raised in the period have been assessed. The report on Phase 1 is expected to be provided to the Minister before the end of August 2011. 1 That is, only allegations of abuse by people who were Defence personnel at the time of the incident fall within the scope of the review. (e) Timeline On present planning, the Review is expected to report to the Minister in March 2012. (f) Cost per stage Phase One is expected to cost over $11m. Anticipated costs for subsequent phase/s will be determined when options are considered. (g) Anticipated final cost Phase One is expected to cost over $11m. Anticipated costs for subsequent phase/s will be determined when options are considered. (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report On 11 October 2011, Volume One (General Findings and Recommendations) and the first tranche of Volume Two (Individual Allegations) was provided to the Minister for Defence. The remainder of Volume Two is yet to be provided. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department At the request of the Minister for Defence, the allegations are being dealt with methodically and at arm's length from Defence. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review The former Secretary of Defence. Review No. 8 (a) Name of the review Comprehensive Review of Defence Estate (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Defence Services and Groups plus Thinc Projects and AECOM (Consultants to Defence) (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Thinc Projects and AECOM (d) Terms of reference On 17 November 2009, the then Minister for Defence, Senator John Faulkner advised that Defence would undertake a comprehensive review of Defence's base requirements and develop options for changes to the estate over the long term, a 25-30 year period. (e) Timeline It was envisaged that the review would take 12-18 months. On 22 June 2011, the Minister for Defence the Hon Stephen Smith MP announced that Defence would undertake a strategic level review of broader ADF Force Posture, with its report provided to Government during the first quarter of 2012. The work on the comprehensive review of the Defence estate is not yet complete but it is informing the ADF Force Posture Review. It is anticipated that this work will resume, taking account of Force Posture Review outcomes as appropriate. (f) Cost per stage As at January 2012, cost for work undertaken by Thinc Projects and AECOM in support of the comprehensive review of the Defence estate is $5.2 million. (g) Anticipated final cost TBC (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report TBC (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department Due to the highly technical nature of the work (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review (This Review was directed by the then Minister for Defence Senator the Hon John Faulkner on 17 November 2009) Review No. 9 (a) Name of the review The Use of Alcohol in the Australian Defence Force (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Professor Margaret Hamilton, executive member of the Australian National Council of Drugs. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Brian Vendenberg (Victoria Health), Professor Margaret Hamilton (Hammar & Healy Consulting), Professor Steve Allsop (Curtin University of Technology. (d) Terms of reference Terms of Reference are publicly available on the Department of Defence website at www.defence.gov.au/culturereviews/index.htm (e) Timeline The Independent Advisory Panel was commissioned on 15 April 2011. Report submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. (f) Cost per stage $0.153 million (g) Anticipated final cost $0.153 million (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Report submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. Defence will respond to all of the reviews in a single, comprehensive response. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department Due to the nature of the issues, the Minister for Defence directed an Independent Review, as announced on 11 April 2011. The advisory panel was led by a subject matter expert to review the strategy for managing alcohol use in the ADF. The then Surgeon General of the Australian Defence Force was on this panel to represent the ADF. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Vice Chief of the Defence Force. Review No. 10 (a) Name of the review Review into the Treatment of Women at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) and the Australian Defence Force (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Ms Elizabeth Broderick, Sex Discrimination Commissioner, on behalf of the Australian Human Rights Commission (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid This review is being funded by Defence. (d) Terms of reference Terms of Reference are publicly available on the Australian Human Rights Commission website at www.hreoc.gov.au/defencereview/terms.html (e) Timeline The review was commissioned on 9 May 2011 and Phase 1 of the Report was tabled in Parliament on 3 November 2011. Phase 2 has commenced and the deadline for submissions is 4 March 2012. (f) Cost per stage Stage 1 – $4.7m Stage 2 – $2m (g) Anticipated final cost The estimated cost of the two reviews is approximately $6.7 million. (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Stage 1 – Tabled in Parliament on 3 November 2011 Stage 2 – Currently underway, due for completion in 2012. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department Due to the nature of the issues, the Minister for Defence directed an Independent Review, as announced on 11 April 2011. It is appropriate that a review of this nature into Defence's culture be conducted by an external organisation. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Minister for Defence Review No. 11 (a) Name of the review Review of the Management of Incidents and Complaints, including Civil and Military Jurisdiction (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review The Inspector General of the Australian Defence Force, Mr Geoff Earley. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid This review was conducted by Defence personnel. (d) Terms of reference Terms of Reference are publicly available on the Department of Defence website at www.defence.gov.au/culturereviews/index.htm (e) Timeline The review commenced on 12 April 2011 and a report was submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. (f) Cost per stage $0.019 (g) Anticipated final cost $0.019 (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Report submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. Defence will respond to all of the reviews in a single, comprehensive response. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department This work was conducted by Department of Defence personnel. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Chief of the Defence Force Review No. 12 (a) Name of the review Review of Social Media and Defence (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review George Patterson Y & R, led by Mr Rob Hudson. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid George Patterson Y & R (d) Terms of reference Terms of Reference are publicly available on the Department of Defence website at www.defence.gov.au/culturereviews/index.htm (e) Timeline The contract for this review commenced on 11 May 2011. The report was submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. (f) Cost per stage $0.296 million (g) Anticipated final cost $0.296 million (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Report submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. Defence will respond to all of the reviews in a single, comprehensive response. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department Due to the nature of the issues, the Minister for Defence directed an Independent Review, as announced on 11 April 2011. The nature of the review, including benchmarking and assessment of Defence against international best practice for overseas military forces and other relevant organisations. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Vice Chief of the Defence Force. Review No. 13 (a) Name of the review Review of Employment Pathways for Australian Public Service Women in the Department of Defence (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Ms Carmel McGregor, Deputy Public Service Commissioner (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid The review was funded by the Department of Defence, with funding costs for staffing transferred from Defence to the Australian Public Service Commission. (d) Terms of reference Terms of Reference are publicly available on the Department of Defence website at www.defence.gov.au/culturereviews/index.htm (e) Timeline The review commenced on 9 May 2011 and a report was submitted to the Minister for Defence on 25 August 2011. (f) Cost per stage $0.228 million (g) Anticipated final cost $0.228 million (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Report submitted to the Minister for Defence on 25 August 2011. Defence will respond to all of the reviews in a single, comprehensive response. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department This work was conducted by personnel from the Australian Public Service Commission and the Department of Defence. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Secretary of the Department of Defence Review No. 14 (a) Name of the review Review of Personal Conduct (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Major General Craig Orme (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Major General Craig Orme and other Defence personnel (d) Terms of reference Terms of Reference are publicly available on the Department of Defence website at www.defence.gov.au/culturereviews/index.htm (e) Timeline The review commenced on 12 April 2011 and a report was submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. (f) Cost per stage Staffing costs for the personnel on this review were funded by Defence. (g) Anticipated final cost No additional costs other than internal staffing costs. (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Report submitted to the Minister for Defence on 2 November 2011. Defence will respond to all of the reviews in a single, comprehensive response. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department This work was conducted by Departmental personnel. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review Vice Chief of the Defence Force. Review No. 15 (a) Name of the review Defence Home Ownership Assistance Scheme Implementation (DHOAS) Review. (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Ernst & Young have been contracted to provide a report on the implementation. A Defence Working Group has been raised to provide input to the review. Personnel Policy and Employment Conditions Branch is conducting the review and will produce the report for Government. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Ernst & Young (d) Terms of reference In line with the R2 initiative of attraction and retention, the review will seek to determine the success of the DHOAS in terms of the number of members who have accessed the scheme and if access to the scheme has influenced members decision to continue to serve in the ADF. From an administrative perspective the review will seek to examine the role of the Department of Veteran's Affairs (DVA) as the contracted scheme administrator, performance of the three loan providers and home loan provider panel arrangement. (e) Timeline A report will be presented to Government by mid 2012. (f) Cost per stage $49,800 (ex GST) at the commencement of the project. $66,400 (ex GST) on delivery of the draft report $49,800 (ex GST) on completion of the project (g) Anticipated final cost $166,000 (ex GST). (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Ernst & Young will report to Defence by 31 March 2012. A final report will be presented to Government by mid 2012. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department It is considered that an independent review of the implementation of the scheme will provide a balanced and impartial opinion of the operation of the scheme and the value of the benefit provided to members. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review At the time of the implementation of the scheme, 1 July 2008, the Government directed that a review of the implementation be conducted after four years. Review No. 16 (a) Name of the review Independent Review of the Potential for Enhanced Cruise Ship Access to Garden Island Sydney. (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Dr Allan Hawke AC, supported by a secretariat of one APS EL2 and two Royal Australian Naval Reserve officers. (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid Dr Allan Hawke AC. Review Secretariat staff salaries (RAN Reserve daily rates). Power Initiatives consultancy for one cost analysis report. Adcorp for issue of Public Notices calling for submissions. (d) Terms of reference TERMS OF REFERENCE POTENTIAL FOR ENHANCED CRUISE SHIP ACCESS TO GARDEN ISLAND, SYDNEY 1. A review is to be carried out into the capacity of Garden Island in Sydney to accommodate increased numbers of visiting cruise ships. The review will assess current and future Royal Australian Navy (RAN) requirements and whether there is scope to enhance cruise ship access to Garden Island, noting its primary role of support to the RAN's raise, train and sustain roles and functions and the timely delivery of maritime operational capability. 2. The review is to examine: a. Outcomes from the New South Wales Government-sponsored Passenger Cruise Terminal Steering Committee Part B report on infrastructure requirements and locations for a Cruise Passenger Terminal east of Sydney Harbour Bridge; b. Current and future RAN requirements for facilities at Garden Island to meet the operational and maintenance needs of home-ported and visiting RAN and allied naval ships; c. Future Defence Materiel Organisation requirements and responsibilities for contracted RAN ship repair and maintenance, including the continuing need for Garden Island to be available for short notice emergency Navy dockings; d. The suitability of existing Garden Island facilities to support more regular cruise ship visits during peak periods and with the degree of advanced notice sought by the industry; e. The economic benefits of enhanced cruise ship access to Sydney Harbour, and the economic contribution of the ongoing Navy presence in Sydney; f. Options for alternative berthing, maintenance and support arrangements for naval vessels both within Sydney and other ports which might be required to allow enhanced cruise ship access to Garden Island during peak periods, with estimates of feasibility, costs and timeframes involved; g. The costs, benefits and impact of the cruise industry investing in purpose built facilities at Garden Island to enable enhanced use of the island by cruise ships; h. Changes to Defence risk profile which would be caused by enhanced cruise ship access to Garden Island, in terms of: i. Acquisition and maintenance of naval ships. ii. Personnel support. iii. Security. iv. Operational readiness. v. Commonwealth financial and legal liability. 3. The review will be guided by the following: a. The Two Ocean Basing policy, which will remain a central tenet of Navy basing and disposition for Navy's larger ships, consistent with strategic guidance. b. The strategic basing principles agreed by the Government as part of the 2009 Defence White Paper Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030. c. An understanding of the technical complexity of major naval vessels, and how this might determine the need for operational bases having ready access to a broad industry base with specialised dockyard facilities and a large labour force possessing trades and skills peculiar to naval requirements. d. The impact of basing Navy ships in major ports such as Sydney on Navy skilled workforce retention. 4. The review will seek wide input from Commonwealth and State Governments, Sydney and other Port Corporations, defence contractors in the ship repair sector, cruise industry representatives, ports and shipping industry representative bodies, the transport and tourism sectors, and the team appointed by Government to undertake the broader Force Posture Review. 5. The review is to commence as soon as possible with a final report tabled to the Minister for Defence by the end of December 2011. (e) Timeline The review was announced by the Minister for Defence on 16 June 2011. In December, the Minister for Defence agreed to extend the submission deadline to 1 February 2012. Dr Hawke submitted the review to the Minister for Defence on 1 February 2012. (f) Cost per stage The review did not feature discrete stages. (g) Anticipated final cost Approximately $200,000. (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Dr Hawke submitted the review to the Minister for Defence on 1 February 2012. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department The Minister for Defence determined the need for an independent review. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review The review was commissioned by the Minister for Defence. Review No. 17 (a) Name of the review Collins Class Submarine Sustainment Business Benchmarking Study (Coles Review) (b) Individuals, groups and companies conducting the review Review Team: Team Leader—Dr John Coles. Team members—Rear Admiral Fred Scourse RN (Rtd), Mr Arthur Fisher, Commodore Paul Greenfield, RAN (Rtd). (c) Individuals, groups and companies being paid BMT Design and Technology Pty. Ltd. First Marine International (d) Terms of reference STUDY INTO THE BUSINESS OF SUSTAINING AUSTRALIA'S STRATEGIC COLLINS CLASS SUBMARINE CAPABILITY TERMS OF REFERENCE AUTHORISATION The Secretary of Defence, Chief of the Defence Force and Secretary of Finance and Deregulation have commissioned this benchmarking study as part of the work program of the Government—ASC Steering Committee overseeing issues relating to Collins Class Submarine (CCSM) sustainment requiring whole-of-government consideration. PURPOSE The purpose of these Terms of Reference is to specify the scope of the benchmarking study into the optimal arrangements for CCSM sustainment. CONTEXT Established in 1985, ASC Pty Ltd (ASC) was chosen in 1987 to design and build the six CCSMs and contracted in 2003 to deliver submarine through life support, and in 2005 a subsidiary of ASC was awarded the shipbuilder role for the Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD). ASC is therefore a nationally strategic industry asset for Australia, providing critical capability in support of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN). ASC, as a Government Business Enterprise (GBE), is both owned by the Australian Government, and for CCSMs, is a sole Industry Partner/Supplier to Defence in a monopsonist relationship. These circumstances are unique in comparison to Defence's other dealings with commercial entities. This uniqueness needs to be recognised and brings significant challenges. ASC is a proprietary company, incorporated under the Corporations Act 2001, and is prescribed as a GBE under the Commonwealth Authorities and Companies Act 1997. Under this commercial framework ASC is required to operate and price efficiently, earn a commercial rate of return and comply with the Commonwealth's Competitive Neutrality Policy. In 2003 Defence established a long term Through Life Support Agreement (TLSA) with ASC for the sustainment of the CCSM. TLSA is essentially a cost-reimbursable, limited performance-incentive contract with annual negotiation of budget and work scope. Defence engages mission system contractors separately and provides materials as Government Furnished Equipment for in-service CCSMs. In 2008, in response to an indication by the then Government that ASC would be privatised, Defence sought to renegotiate the TLSA to reflect industry best practice arrangements, including recognition of the need for ASC to undertake incremental improvement and, with increasing levels of maturity, risk transfer and accountability for outcomes. Since 2009 a range of Collins program reform initiatives have been ongoing including the establishment of the Australian Submarine Program Office, collaboration between the RAN, DMO and ASC, agreement on the Integrated Master Schedule (IMS) and negotiation of a performance-based In-Service Support Contract (ISSC) with ASC. A critical aspect of the ISSC is the establishment of appropriate business arrangements and performance parameters to benchmark CCSM sustainment to ensure the whole-of-government objectives are met. ASC wishes to identify world best practice goals in order to establish objective benchmarks against which it can demonstrate its improvements and compliance. Defence wishes to ensure that the required availability of reliable submarines is delivered to the RAN through the CCSM Integrated Master Schedule at an affordable price and represents value for money. A joint aim of Defence and ASC under the ISSC is to enhance the national submarine sustainment industry through stronger engagement and utilisation of a wider industry base with a best of breed 'Make – Buy' approach which aims to provide long term efficiencies and value for money. The key principles aligned to these outcomes and arrangements are captured in an ISSC Heads of Agreement between Defence and ASC now used to guide the detailed contract negotiations. OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE 4.1 The broad objectives for this review are to determine: he optimal commercial arrangements between Defence and ASC to support the delivery of efficient and effective CCSM sustainment, which will be used to guide the ongoing development of the ISSC commercial framework; the appropriate performance goals for sustainment activity, based on world best practice efficiency and effectiveness benchmarks; options for demonstrating value for money in sustainment activity and the supply chain arrangements; opportunities for improvements in management arrangements between ASC, DMO and the RAN to achieve an efficient submarine sustainment business; future infrastructure needs to support the submarine sustainment activity; measures to be implemented by DMO and the RAN to ensure that ASC is able to operate under a performance-based contract; and the subsequent priorities for ASC, DMO and the RAN reform to effect greatest improvement, given time, budget and system constraints. 4.2 It is not intended that this review examine or make recommendations regarding ASC's overall governance framework, but rather the commercial and contractual arrangements for submarine sustainment between ASC and DMO. METHOD OF CONDUCT This study will be conducted in four phases: Phase 1 Mobilisation, scoping analysis and planning – It is proposed to engage the review team on a not to exceed time and materials contract arrangement to undertake the development of the detailed statement of work, deliverables, schedule and planning arrangements through initial consultation between the proposed review team, Defence, Finance and Deregulation and ASC. The outcome of this phase will be a detailed and structured scope of work, to be reviewed by the Government—ASC Steering Committee, with an accurate cost and schedule for its execution. This will form the basis of a contract amendment to complete the main body of the review. Phase 2 Data collection, analysis, option and implementation strategy development and interim recommendations – This phase will be based upon the detailed statement of work, deliverables and schedule developed during Phase 1. A key outcome of this phase will be a framework and industry best practice benchmarks against which DMO, the RAN and ASC performance in delivering CCSM sustainment can be assessed. Phase 3 Final Report and recommendations – This phase will enable the review team to take feedback and incorporate further clarification to the findings and recommendations based upon the review of the Interim Report by Defence, Finance and Deregulation and ASC. Phase 4 Follow Up Review, Analysis and Recommendations – This phase will enable the review team to undertake a progress review of the transition to the new ISSC and assessment of performance against the recommended framework and industry best practice benchmarks. TIMING The initial phase of the study will commence early in the third quarter 2011 to establish and agree the detailed scope of the tasking, establish the planning framework, team administration and support arrangements. The main body of work is expected to be conducted during the third and fourth quarter of 2011 with an interim report for consideration by the Government—ASC Steering Committee to be received by December 2011 and final Report for consideration by the Government—ASC Steering Committee by March 2012. A follow up review will be scheduled for the second and third quarter 2012 to coincide with preparations to transition the ISSC into a more mature and robust performance based arrangement. SPECIFIC DELIVERABLES The deliverables from Phase 1 of the review will be a detailed statement of work, outline of proposed deliverables, review schedule, administrative framework and a supporting cost estimate for the conduct of Phase 2, 3 and 4. 7.2 Other deliverables will be specified as a result of the contract amendment to incorporate the outcomes from Phase 1 of the review. (e) Timeline Phase 1 report released by Minister for Defence and Minister for Defence Materiel on 13 December 2012. Phase 2 Draft Report will be provided by the Review Team in April 2012. (f) Cost per stage Phase 1—$480,000. Phase 2—$2,717,000 (cost contracted to date; Phase 2 is not fully contracted) (g) Anticipated final cost Under departmental review (h) Scheduled reporting date, including any preliminary stages and the final report Refer to (e) above. (i) Reasons why the work was not conducted by senior executive service members of the department The review, commissioned by Secretary of Department of Finance & Deregulation, Secretary of Department of Defence & Chief Defence Force, is intended to be an independent review, which necessitated the engagement of an external expert. The review is being led by Dr John Coles, an independent expert from BMT Defence Services in the United Kingdom. Dr Coles has more than 30 years experience in the design, acquisition and sustainment of ships and submarines, principally in the United Kingdom. Between 1997 and 2005 he was the Chief Executive of the United Kingdom's Warship Support Agency (previously the Ships Support Agency), which is responsible for the maintenance and repair of all Royal Navy submarines, ships, and auxiliaries. Between 2005 and 2007 Dr Coles was head of the British Future Aircraft Carrier Project. (j) Departmental officer who commissioned the review The review was commissioned by Government- ASC Steering Committee, comprising Secretary of Department of Finance & Deregulation, Secretary of Department of Defence & Chief Defence Force.