Mr NIKOLIC (Bass) (11:40): I move: That this House congratulates the Government for its continuation of Defence reform, specifically in respect of strategic force modernisation, enhanced national security, and regional stability, including: (1) the acquisition of: (a) an additional 58 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft; and (b) the eight P-8 Maritime Surveillance aircraft and commitment to the Triton Unmanned Aerial Vehicle; and (2) a commitment to: (a) enhancing Australia's overall Defence capability, close cooperation, and interoperability with regional partners; and (b) provide certainty for Defence planning, capability and doctrine development. I have great pleasure in bringing before the House this motion to highlight the government's defence reform agenda, which responds to evolving strategic circumstances in our region and beyond. Our agenda spans three diverse areas, including a comprehensive first-principles review of all aspects of the department and in particular the Defence Materiel Organisation, a commitment to return the Defence budget to two per cent of gross domestic product within 10 years and the development of a new defence white paper—a document that will articulate a clear Australian national security strategy, including the all-important funding and planning dimensions. In turn, this will give defence industry in particular the certainty it requires. Regrettably, far-sighted commitment to reform of this type has not always been the hallmark of federal policy. Too often, defence has been seen as a convenient means of achieving short-term savings, at the overall cost and risk of long-term defence preparedness. Labor's embrace of the defence of Australia doctrine during the 1980s and 1990s is a case in point. Under it, Australia's strategic outlook and commitment apparently stopped at the sea-air gap. Yet much of my 31-year career in the Defence Force was spent working in areas and thinking about military challenges well beyond the sea-air gap. The defence of Australia policy had the effect of landlocking our Army inside continental Australia—replete with the inherent withering of land force capability. This situation set back Australian strategic interests and influence a decade or more. I know it because I professionally lived through it. Not until after East Timor did Defence make sizeable steps to recover from this short-sighted introspection. Perhaps just as bad, this period represents a graveyard of lost opportunities to prepare well and realistically for the future; even if only to use elements of our professional military to engage constructively and practically—as is their proven strength—within our immediate region. Labor's 2009 white paper falsely promised an economic grand bargain with Defence. The bargain went something like this: Defence had to find some $20 billion of savings in a 10-year period. The Labor government promised real growth of three per cent in the Defence budget to 2017-18, 2.2 per cent from 2017-18 to 2030 and a bit of a deal with indexation. The combined effect of those two inputs would fund the capability requirements for Force 2030. I notice the member for Hunter is in the chamber. His media release of 12 May 2009 also promised $43 billion of much-needed new initiatives from 2009 to 2019. Mr Fitzgibbon: You were a key adviser; I always appreciated your efforts in that regard! Mr NIKOLIC: And I cheered on the efforts of the member for Hunter in that regard. But despite the heroic efforts of the member for Hunter, there was no grand bargain. The department, sadly, was used as an ATM whenever Senator Wong or the member for Lilley had a fiscal itch to scratch. From 2009-10 to 2016-17, instead of all these new initiatives, $16 billion was cut or deferred from the defence budget—$9.2 billion of that from the Defence Capability Plan. Defence now faces a deficit of $12 billion on current plans over the next decade, with an additional $18 billion required just to achieve the aspirations of Force 2030—119 key projects were left delayed, 43 were severely degraded and eight were cancelled. The sad truth is, Labor did not approve a complete 10-year defence DCP after 2009 because they did not want the Australian people to know they were using the defence department as an ATM. In 2012-13 the lowest share of GDP was allocated to defence since 1938—at 1.56 per cent, the largest cut since the Korean conflict. Little wonder that the Australian Strategic Policy Institute referred to the defence budget as an 'unsustainable mess'. Little wonder that US President Obama publicly commended the Prime Minister's leadership on the defence budget just last week in Washington for restoring some much-needed common sense in this important public policy area. Our budget last month is not only about getting the Australian economy back on track but getting defence back on track. The coalition is determined that the stop-start-stop cycle, which has so adversely affected defence planning and procurement in the past, will not resurface on our watch. This is why this motion focuses, in part, on returning and maintaining expenditure on defence consistently at two per cent of GDP. Yes, a professional military capability is expensive, but for good reason—our national future is the stake at risk. If we want quality, and we do, we must pay for it—and we will. The best national security policy is surely one which is based on vigilance, flexibility and agility. Refreshingly, today's motion recognises, too, the unseeable nature of defence threats in both our region and the world at large. No strategic expert can divine or foresee the future absolutely. The very best that can be offered is to be consistently least wrong—or at least less wrong than one's adversaries. This observation reinforces the triumvirate of vigilance, flexibility and agility. During the 1980s and 1990s, Labor's national security policy assumed Australia to be, more or less, immune from what transpired in the wider world, even at a time when the Berlin Wall was being torn down. All of us, I think, have grown up since then; the scales have fallen from the eyes of even the most myopic. Australia is not isolated from distant events; we cannot rely unduly on others to defend us. We must be prepared to continue, if necessary, to do more 'heavy lifting' where security is concerned, if, when, and wherever it is in our interests to do so. This motion is redolent with those sentiments. In more recent times, Australian service men and women have risked their lives to support stabilisation operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, have fought two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, continue to undertake the hazardous constabulary operation against illegal people smuggling at sea and have supported multiple humanitarian missions, including those in Rwanda, Indonesia, PNG, Pakistan and the Philippines. From an Australian national security perspective this diversity has proven three things. First, international conflict and emergency can hail from anywhere, often very quickly, and without clear warning. Second, Australia, and Australians, have the resources, expertise and confidence to make very significant contributions not only regionally but globally. And, third, constructive engagement with other nations has itself the potential to contribute to future peace and stability. But none of these things is a guarantee or replacement for careful and cogent national defence planning and preparation. In the words of the ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, 'Only the dead have seen the end of war.' For this reason, the coalition's defence reform agenda has focused deliberately and specifically on a first-principles review, a strategic white paper and the financial surety of a return to two per cent GDP within a decade. My request to the member for Batman, the member for Hunter and their colleagues is: let's have a bipartisan approach on defence. As history has shown, the ALP in opposition always shifts to the left on defence and foreign policy. That has perhaps never been as evident in the Labor Party as it is now, with the member for Sydney and Senator Conroy leading Labor's national security team. But rather than make superficial political points, as the member for Sydney and Senator Conroy repeatedly do, why don't we agree on this vital area of national policy? Let's work together to strengthen practical cooperation and interoperability with our US alliance partners. Let's encourage the quicker conclusion of negotiations between ourselves and the United States on a legally-binding agreement to govern force posture initiatives. Instead of pandering to the left wing of the Labor Party and the Greens, let's build closer cooperation with regional partners, including Indonesia and Japan. I call on the member for Batman, the member for Hunter and the many other sensible people in the opposition, like Senator Faulkner, the members for Holt and Bruce and others, not to let the Labor Party weaken on the defence budget and the US alliance. Let us take forward initiatives that reflect our national interests, that reflect this parliament's faith in, and determined commitment to, the men and women of the ADF—as well as to the hardworking public servants in the department, who make an invaluable contribution in so many policy and enabling areas. This House, I am sure, joins me in recognising the quality of their individual and collective contribution and sacrifice for Australian national security. I commend both their efforts and this motion to the House. The DEPUTY SPEAKER ( Mr Broadbent ): Is the motion seconded? Mr Brough: I second the motion and reserve my right to speak.