Senator HUMPHRIES (Australian Capital Territory) (20:03): I want to dwell for a while on a very important part of Australia's future defence requirements—that is, our need to create a new submarine to replace the Collins class submarine, which is approaching the end of its useful life. This is not the place or the time to dwell on the debate about the wisdom of the Collins project and how well it has served Australia's needs. It is rather the time to focus on determining what should replace it as, in the next decade or two, the Collins submarines ceases to be effective for Australia's defence needs. I have to say that a rising sense of alarm greets many people in this country when they look at the progress the present government is making on finding that replacement iconic submarine. I call tonight on the Minister for Defence to show leadership and genuine commitment to progress this vital defence capability project, which is so important to our national security. A threshold question in determining what Australia might need by way of a future submarine is: what exactly should that submarine be able to do? Defining what you are going shopping for is pretty important before you actually hit the shops. The government purported to answer those questions when it published its Defence white paper in 2009 in shaping this defence force for the future to be called Force 2030. It talked about preparing for the Asia-Pacific century: an era of diminishing US primacy, in this part of the world at least, and a time when Australia would need to develop a more potent defence force able to contribute to regional and global military contingencies. As a result of that defining of what Australia needed, it determined in that white paper that Australia should acquire 12 new non-nuclear submarines, which would be assembled in South Australia. These boats were to be bigger than the Collins class submarines, with longer range and an ambitious array of capabilities built into them. That is all very well and I do not seriously take issue with what the government set out to do at that point. What I do have concern about is that, three years after the white paper was issued and more than four years after the Labor Party in opposition flagged its intention to build submarines in this country to replace the Collins submarines, we still do not have a meaningful beginning of this project. We still do not know exactly what this project will look like or when it will begin. Given that the submarines are a pivotal part of our naval capability, indeed of our entire defence of Australia capacity, that lack of decision is of great concern. Why there is a failure to make this seminal decision is hard to say. It is a decision which is obviously important for the defence of Australia; it is a decision which is important for Australia's defence industry; and it is a decision which is particularly important for South Australia. Could it be anything to do with the fact that the Prime Minister who made the decision to build 12 submarines, Kevin Rudd, had a strong personal interest—and still does—in foreign affairs and a geopolitical sense of what the submarines could provide and he has been replaced by a Prime Minister who, on her own admission, does not have a great interest in foreign affairs and perhaps is not so pressed by the need to make a decision on this important foreign affairs and defence capability? There has been much debate about what kind of submarine Australia needs to be buying or building. There have been many important discussion papers and, indeed, there are a number of options available to Australia if it were to choose a so-called off-the-shelf option for replacing the Collins submarines. The Spanish produce a submarine built by Navantia, which is presently building Australia's LHD platforms. There is the French Scorpene class submarine, of about 1,900 tonnes, which is already in service in other navies. The Germans have the HDW Type 212/214 submarine, which boasts an air-independent propulsion. It is also about 1,900 tonnes in displacement. The Japanese make a submarine, the 4,200-tonne Soryu class. It is the largest conventionally powered submarine currently in service and, on the face of it, might present an interesting option for Australia were it to choose to buy such a submarine. And, of course, in the area of nuclear submarines there are options from countries such as the United States—the Virginia class, for example—and elsewhere. However, the government has indicated some preference for building an Australian submarine, whether to a foreign design but certainly Australian built. 'Son of Collins' will be a major technological and financial challenge for Australia, costing, without question, many billions of dollars. But the fact that at the beginning of 2012, having flagged the need for a decision about such a submarine project more than three years ago, we have not progressed to the next stage and decided what we should do next is a matter of great concern. Obviously if, for example, we were to purchase a submarine off the shelf, even for platforms proven in service there would be a significant amount of time to actually acquire those submarines—they are not literally off the shelf; they have to be built to order, as it were, from an existing design. If we were to design and construct future submarines here, we are presented immediately with a very serious capability problem. The head of the Future Submarine Project said at last week's Pacific 2012 conference in Sydney that even if we made the decision today we are unlikely to have the first boat in service for an Australian constructed submarine before 2033, which is generally accepted to be well beyond the life of the present Collins submarines. And, of course, the longer we project the creation of a new submarine option into the future, the more, with the ending of the Collins project, we suffer a withering of industry and technical skills needed to sustain either the maintenance or the building of a new submarine. Those skills are particularly important in looking at how we ensure a continuous capacity to maintain shipbuilding in this country. When a project finishes, whether it is a ship or a submarine or anything else of major specialty, we lose naval architects, engineers, welders, all sorts of specialist tradespeople, who have no other job to go to. This is particularly the case with respect to submarines. There are no private sector submarines being built anywhere in the world. People with those skills often have to go overseas if they want to work in that area in the future, and we lose that capacity, almost certainly permanently, from Australia. That is why this government needs to make a decision. The Minister for Defence has indicated that he will be taking a submission to the National Security Committee of cabinet in the first quarter of this year to progress this project. I sincerely hope that he does, because any further delay in this decision would be, frankly, disastrous for Australia's future defence capability. Good work is going on on the Future Submarine Project, but it needs a commitment by the government and also, I suspect, it needs more money. I call on this government, particularly on this minister, to make a clear commitment to this project soon. My colleague Senator Johnston, the shadow minister for defence, speaking at the Submarine Institute of Australia in Adelaide late last year, called on the government to commit significant resources to this project without delay. I repeat that call here tonight. The minister must show leadership and commitment on this important project, which will be easily the biggest defence project in our history, for the sake of national security, for the sake of certainty, for the sake of sustaining a viable and strong Australian defence industry and the future of our nation generally.